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Africa: A continent is waking up.  Not through aid or wealth from the 
exploitation of natural resources, but through a technological revolution. The 
access to affordable mobile telecommunication. Inspired by deregulation and 
pioneered by local champions who have taken a lead in what is today's fastest 
growing mobile market in the world. There is money to be made in these 
markets, attracting more and more operators from the northern hemisphere. 
However   positive   the   short   term   impact   of   this   revolution   may   be, 
governments should try hard to assure a market of continued competition 
among network operators, as this competition is the source of a self propelled 
creation of welfare and new opportunities, motivated from within Africa.
Chapter   1  of   this   thesis   highlights   the   positive   impact   of   mobile 
telecommunication on the social and economic life in Sub Saharan Africa. 
Chapter 2 builds on the static as well as the dynamic version of the Network 
Pricing   Game,   a   model   developed   by   Dr.   Carolyn   Gideon,   to   stress   the 
immanent threat of network markets turning into a monopoly. This theses 
ends in Chapter 3 with an brief outlook on further drivers of economic growth 
and opportunities awaiting Sub Saharan Africa in the coming decade. 
vIndex of Variables
o
Market share of Firm 1 with  −o = 1− o  as market share of 
Firm 2 respectively.
c Marginal cost of providing service to a single customer.
F Fixed cost of providing service in the market per subscriber.

Network subscribers' propensity to switch to a rival network 
for a given difference in prices.
Pit The price chosen by Firm i in Period t, with  i , t ∈ 1, 2 .
P
M Monopoly price. The maximum price before customers start to 
disconnect
P1
* Price of Firm 1 that maximizes it's profits for the single period 
game.
P2
* Price of Firm 2 that maximizes it's profits for the single period 
game in response to Firm 1's price.
P11
Coex Price of Coexistence of Firm 1, set in period 1.
P11
EI Price set by Firm 1 in period 1, inducing exit of Firm 2.
1
T Profit of Firm 1 in the dynamic Network
1 Pricing Game.
2
T Profit of Firm 2 in the dynamic Network Pricing Game.
2
T - IN Profit of Firm 2 in the dynamic Network Pricing Game, when 
Firm 2 is still in the market in the second period.
2
T - OUT
Profit of Firm 2 in the dynamic Network Pricing Game, when 
Firm 2 decides or is forced to exit the competition in the 
second period.
1
Max Maximum profit of Firm 1.
1The dynamic Network Pricing Game consists of two period.
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ix1  Telecommunication: A Brief Overview
1.1  Developed World
In all societies of the developed world, telecommunication has long become a 
incremental part of life, in private and business use alike, although its costly 
usage at the beginning of the last decade favored business, innovation and 
subsequently   economies   of   scale   opened   up   the   access   to   wireless 
telecommunication for private users. 
In the turbulent years of the late 90's, when the .com bubble was gaining 
momentum, the privatization of state owned fixed-line telecommunication 
companies in the US and Europe made it regularly onto the front pages of the 
business   press.   Main   challenges   of   a   transition   from   state   ownership   to 
privately   held   companies   and   a   subsequent   competition   in   the 
telecommunication industry, are depicted by Joseph Farrell: 
“The FCC and state regulators have been working hard since the 1996 
passage of the Telecommunications Act to restructure regulation to 
make it more compatible with competition. Deregulation remains an 
especially   complex   problem   for   telecommunications,   given   such 
factors as its dependence on carrier-to-carrier cooperation, tendency 
toward   a   natural   monopoly,   the   multidimensional   aspects   of 
competition, and the political constraints on deregulation.”
2 
Remarkable was the frenzy across Europe, at the turn of the millennium when 
the auctioning of third generation mobile telecommunication licenses for the 
3G radio spectrum took place. Similar to a bank run the bidding mobile 
network operators raised their bids far beyond rational levels only to grab one 
of the much sought licenses, entitling it's holders to use a new predefined 
wave   spectrum   for   their   carrier   signals   to   enable   the   delivery   of   next 
generation   services.   Services   with   high   demands   on   data   transfer   going 
beyond   the   classic   use   of   voice   and   text   transfer.   Subsequently   the 
telecommunication industry was haunted by it's own economic crisis that 
followed after the bust of the .com bubble.
2Farrell, Joseph.  Prospects for Deregulation in Telecommunication. Department of 
Economics, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA . Industrial and Corporate 
Change, Volume 6, Number 4, 1997.
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The above lines are meant to illustrate how challenging technological and 
market structure changes can be for economies and economic systems alike.
1.1  Sub-Saharan Africa
“You can resist an invading army; you cannot resist an idea whose 
time has come.”
3
The idea addressed in the following paragraphs is that of a technological 
revolution across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). An idea on the brink to reality for 
an increasing part of Africa's population of currently 836 Million
4. To give a 
better understanding of the actual state, I will discuss and show up the current 
development   stages   in   various   countries   highlighting   their   individual 
particularities to create a better picture about leading and lagging countries. 
According to Ernest & Young's first African Study conducted in this field, the 
“African   markets   are   at   differing   stages   of   evolution,   not   just   in   the 
telecommunications   field,   but   across   the   broader   economic   and   social 
spectrum.   From   countries   like   South   Africa   [...],   which   have   the   largest 
economies, to countries like Somalia, which has a limited formal economy, the 
differences are significant. 
5”
A direct consequence of these different stages is an equally scattered picture 
of mobile penetration rates. It allows to divide countries into three categories 
as shown in Table 1. Low levels of mobile communication take up, combined 
with a robust economic growth averaging 2%
6 in the SSA region between 2000 
and 2006, are contributing to emerging opportunities. This is especially the 
case in countries with penetration rates between 50 and 20%. Economies 
listed in this segment report the highest figures in subscriber growth. The 
interest of governments to profit from the telecommunication boom in their 
countries is big and the ways of doing so are numerous.
3Hugo,   Victor.  Histoire   d'un   Crime.   1852.   English   translation   taken   from:   The 
Economist. A special report on entrepreneurship . March 12th 2009
4Haub, Carl. Kent, Mary Mederios.  2009  World Population Data Sheet.  Population 
Reference Bureau. Washington, USA.
5De la Bachelerie, Vincent. Global Telecommunications Leader, Ernest & Young. Africa 
connected – A telecommunications growth story. 2009.
6International Bank for Reconstruction and Development - The World Bank,  Africa 
Development Indicators. 2008/09
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1.2  The   impact   on   welfare   of   increasing 
liberalization   in   African   telecommunication 
markets
Emerging Telecommunication Companies.  A fundamental change in 
policy, pursuing the process of local deregulation in telecommunications, from 
Senegal to Mauritius, marks the starting block for the race of technological 
revolution   in   Africa.   Very   soon   after   the   successful   establishment   of   an 
industry regulation body the first companies started to emerge, offering GSM 
mobile phone telecommunication services. The founding years of the early 
movers in this sector are going back to the mid 1990's. There we find the first 
big names incorporated in countries whose politics have levelled the playing 
field fast enough to attract investors. Most of these early days companies are 
still   operating   today.   In   their   local   markets   as   well   as   in   neighbouring 
countries. Vodacom is South Africa's biggest player with a current customer 
base of 28.24
7 Million and a corresponding market share of  55%
6 was founded 
in 1994. MTN the second largest operator in South Africa dates back to 1994 
as well.
7Vodacom - Financial Statements, Interim results for the six months ending 30
th of 
September 2009. Company Website
3
Table 1: Sub categories of mobile penetration rates in Africa. 
Source: International Telecommunications Union; Ernst & Young Analysis
Developed
Over 50% penetration
• Lower mobile net additions
• These include:
Algeria
Botswana
Gabon
Libya
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Namibia
Seychelles
South Africa
Tunisia
20 to 49% penetration
• Highest net additions per month
• These include:
Emerging
Less than 20% penetration
• Highly regulated or politically 
Unstable markets
• These include:
Virgin
Angola 
Benin 
Cameroon 
Congo
Egypt 
Equator. Guinea 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea Republic 
Guinea-Bissau 
Ivory Coast
Kenya 
Lesotho
Liberia 
Mali 
Nigeria 
Sao Tome &
Principe 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia
Burkina Faso
Burundi 
Central African
Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Djibouti 
Democratic
Republic of 
Congo (DRC)
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Madagascar
Malawi 
Mozambique
Niger 
Rwanda 
Somalia 
Zimbabwe1   Telecommunication: A Brief Overview
Kenya.  Going  up north east the continent, companies such as Kenya's 
Safaricom were formed in 1997 as a fully owned subsidiary of Telkom Kenya, 
the countries fixed line operator, a 100% state owned monopolist. Safaricom, 
at the time this theses was written, owns a market share in Kenya of 77.5% 
according to the World Cellular Information Service
8. Today the Government of 
Kenya holds a stake of 35% in the company. Vodafone PLC of England owns 
40%   whereas   the   remaining   25%   are   in   free   float   on   the   Kenya   Stock 
Exchange. During the time of the Sfaricom Initial Public Offering (IPO) in March 
2008, the country had been in a stock market boom. Corporate and private 
sentiment towards stocks was subject to a broad hype, fueling a speculation 
wave   that   soon   spread   from   telecommunications   to   other   sectors   and 
companies listed on the Kenyan Stock Exchage.
Ethiopia.  Ethiopia is the bottom of development and comes last in any 
continent wide mobile telecommunication ranking. This fact cannot be blamed 
on its weak economic figures and GDP. It is more attributed to the lack of 
deregulating the market, allowing new entries. Politics in this regard have 
failed in both, the stimulus of a mobile telecommunication industry and the 
providing   of   services   through   the   state   owned   operator   the   Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Corporation. Although Ethiopia's beginnings in fixed line 
telecommunication date back to “1894, with the installation of 477 km long 
telephone   and   telegram   lines   from   Harar   to   Addis   Ababa”
9  the   mobile 
deployment and facilitation of wireless communication is a story of failure. 
From   Ethiopia's   population   of   currently   80.7
10  Million   only   3.2%
11  have 
subscribed to a mobile phone service. From official source one can deduce, 
that   during   2007   and   2008   the   overall   quality   of   services   has   further 
degraded, as the network capacity has not been upgraded while the number of 
subscribers grew from a small base. It is reported that most of the day the 
GSM network was overwhelmed by the traffic of calls and text messages. 
According to a reports by Cellular News, the state run operator has completed 
a network upgrade in the second half of 2009, notably assuring the supply of 
8Safaricom - Unaudited Half year results for the period ended 30 September 2009. 
www.safaricom.co.ke
9Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation. Historical Background. www.ethionet.et
10World Bank, World Development Indicators. 2008. www.worldbank.org
11Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation.  ETC’s Growth Perspectives in network 
coverage. 2007/2008.
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electricity with the installation of 150 diesel generators, to counter regular 
black outs related to power supply problems
12.
Democratic   Republic   of   Congo.  Returning   to   the   review   of   the 
beginnings   in   African   mobile   telecommunications   we   turn   to   another 
underdeveloped country in Central Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) had seen it's first operators emerge in 2000 with OASIS SPRL followed 
by Vodacom and Celtel Congo in the same year. A year later Congo Chine 
Telecom entered the market. In 2002 Supercell SPRL joined the competition 
and 2008 has seen the latest entry by Africtell. With a current penetration rate 
of approximately 20% the market shares in subscribers range from slightly 
over 50%
13 for Vodacom, down to around 4% for TIGO.
Nigeria. From the Westafrica region Nigeria is the most interesting country 
for an analysis covering a shot introduction of its market structure and players. 
Nigeria has a special role in Africa as it is the most populous country with a 
population of over 150 Million. The average population age is only 19 years. 
These  figures  undermine  the  huge potential  for mobile   operators  in  this 
prospering country. Latest data show that Nigeria has a total of 67.84
14 million 
mobile phone subscribers translating into a penetration rate of 49.4%
12. 
MTN Nigeria Communications Limited and Celtel Nigeria Ltd a subsidiary of 
ZAIN, who has introduced the first 3G network in December 2008, are both in 
operation since mid 2001. They have a market share of 46.19% and 24.47%, 
positioning them on first and third place by market share. The countries 
second   largest   operator   is   Globacom   Ltd.   who   has   started   offering   it's 
telecommunication services in 2003. It's market share is at 26.87% These 
three top players dominate the market with their cumulative share of 98% of 
all Nigerian mobile phone subscribers. Two remaining operators are competing 
for the 2% of the market not served by the big operators. Emerging Markets 
Telecommunications Services (EMTS) is leading this group with a market share 
12Cellular News.  Ethiopian Operator Nears Completion of Network Upgrade. July 3
rd 
2009.   Accessed   online   the   13
th  January   2010   at   http://www.cellular-
news.com/story/38351.php
13Autorité de Regulation de la Poste et des Télécommunication au Congo – ARPTC. 
Etat des Lieux Semestriel des Telecommunications en République Democratique du 
Congo. 2007. www.arptc.cd
14Nigerian Communications Commission – NCC. Subscriber Data At A Glance. August 
2009. www.ncc.gov.ng
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of 1.76% translating into a customer base of approximately million. MTEL is a 
mobile telecommunications company 100% owned by the Nigerian State. It 
was   created   in   1996,   when   the   government   decided   to   split   it's 
telecommunication operations into a fixed line (Nitel) and a GSM (MTEL) 
business. Despite MTEL's long existence and access to state funds, it has failed 
to delver competitive service qualities and prices. This is reflected by it's poor 
market share of 0.44%
14, in a strong growing market environment.
The   following   illustration   visualizes   the   enormous   growth   Nigeria   has 
experienced in mobile phone subscriptions and services.
6
Illustration 1: Nigerian Mobile Subscriber's Data 1999 to 2009. Source: 
Nigerian Communications Commission, www.ncc.gov.ng1   Telecommunication: A Brief Overview
1.3  Competition   creating   welfare:   four   key 
elements
“When the first mobile networks were launched in Africa two decades 
ago, few people imagined that mobile phones would become Africa’s 
communications device of choice. In 1989, only South Africa had an 
operative mobile cellular network, and there were less than 4’000 
subscriptions.  It  took   seven  years   to   surpass  one   million   mobile 
subscriptions. The 100 million barrier was shattered in 2006, and by 
the end of 2008 there were 246 million mobile subscriptions in Africa 
”
15
In 2001 the number of mobile phone subscriptions overtook the number of 
fixed lines, making Africa the first continent where this had happened
16. This 
decent track record of growth is very likely to be continued on the continent in 
the coming years, according to the English thinktank Africa & Middle East 
Telecom Week. In a recent publication they present their estimates regarding 
the evolution of mobile phone penetration in Africa.
15ITU World Telecommunication. Information Society Statistical Profiles 2009 : Africa . 
Chapter 2,  Mobile growth: achievements and challenges .
16Srivastava, Lara. African Telecommunication Indicators, ITU, 7th edition, May 2004. 
Geneva, Switzerland. www.itu.int/ti.
7
Illustration 2: Africa – Mobile Subscribers and Penetration (2002-2012). 
Source: Africa & Middle East Telecom Week, African Mobile Factbook 20081   Telecommunication: A Brief Overview
Several   reasons   characterize   the   growing   acceptance   and   use   of   mobile 
phones and service. 
First  there   is   the   absence   of   traditional   fixed   line   telecommunication 
networks in most SSA countries. Apart from the  capitals most rural and urban 
regions in Africa have been deprived from access to fixed lines. At the time 
they   were   in   use,   installed   by   colonial   rulers,   there   was   no   interest   in 
deploying these networks beyond purposes of colonial interests. Even if this 
have been the case, the price to pay would have locked out 99% of the 
indigenous population. As a result the average number of fixed telephone lines 
per 100 inhabitants in SSA stands at 1.5 in strong contrast to 31.6  mobile 
cellular telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants
17 . 
Second there is the benefit of technological research and development that 
led to the invention of the mobile phone. Since Dr. Martin Cooper of Motorola 
made the first mobile call to his counterpart at AT&T, Dr. Joel S. Engel on April 
3
rd  1973, a lot has changed. The first generation mobile handset he had 
developed was turned into a gadget available to the masses through the 
effects of scale in mass production of semiconductors and parts, resulting in a 
downward pressure on mobile handset prices. The Kenyan mobile operator 
Safaricom presented an interesting, cheap hand-held in August 2009. The 
Simu ya Solar  has the benefit of being charged by solar power opening 
households with no electricity the door to mobile telecommunication for a 
price of   2,999 Kenyan Shiling – approximately 28 Euro
18. These are the 
ingredients   permitting   Africa   to   leapfrog   an   older   technology   (fixed   line 
telecommunication) and adopt the latest technology available, to the benefits 
of all involved.
Third  there   is   the   competition   between   operators   on   pricing.   This   is 
reducing the entry barriers for consumers to mobile services. A few years back 
the first owners of mobile phones in rural areas made a living by renting their 
phone and selling phone minutes to villagers who could not afford to own a 
phone but did want to call a friend or family member in a distant town. This 
17Teltscher, Susan et al. International Telecommunications Union, Market Information 
and Statistics Division. Information Society Statistical Profiles 2009: Africa. Geneva, 
Switzerland. 2009. 
18Safaricom. Press release.  Safaricom Goes Green With New Solar-Charged Phone. 
Nairobi, Kenya. August 2009.
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phone   call   saved   them   a   long   and   costly   journey.   The   approach   was 
subsequently copied and adopted by most mobile operators in Africa. Their 
customers can recharge their own phones with calling time for as little as 0.05 
Euro in thousands of little shops spread across the country. This method of 
payment enables people without bank accounts to have a phone. The costs of 
running a phone shop network can be almost neglected as many merchants 
offer phone credits as a side activity touching a fixed percentage of sales. 
Benefits on the other hand are huge. For example no unpaid invoices will ever 
occur with this prepaid system. A reason why 94,8%
19  of all African mobile 
phone contracts are prepaid.
Fourth  are network externalities. Beyond the positive direct effects of 
communicating   effortless   over   large   distances   the   positive   spillover   of 
telecommunication   networks   is 
immense.   A   recent   special   report
20 
from   the   Economist   on   telecoms   in 
emerging   markets   mentioned   that   a 
10%   increase   in   mobile   telecom-
munications   penetration   in   emerging 
markets translates into a rise  of 0.8 
points in GDP. A result only toppled by 
access   to   the   internet,   especially   to 
broadband connections.  The  boost in 
GDP   growth   is   attributed   to   new 
possibilities   for   business   ventures, 
resulting   gains   in   the   flow   and 
circulation of important information and 
the access to knowledge and knowledge databases
21 for sectors spanning from 
education, agriculture and horticulture to medical aid and mobile banking, 
increasing   the   overall   efficiency   of   the   economy.   In   Uganda   such   an 
information database service enabled by mobile phone ownership is called 
19Al Morshid, Sami Al Basheer. International Telecommunications Union. Information 
Society Statistical Profiles 2009 : Africa. 2009.
20Standage, Tom. Special Report on telecoms in emerging markets: Eureka moments. 
The Economist. September 26
th to October 2
nd 2009. 
21Question  Box. SMS  service  for questions  from plant  diseases to birth  control. 
http://questionbox.org
9
Illustration 3: Hierarchy of boosts. 
Source:       The economist/World 
Bank/Qiang 20091   Telecommunication: A Brief Overview
Question Box. It has become an important channel of knowledge transfer for 
every day problems. As the founder of this initiative, Mrs. Rose Shuman 
explains: “The premise behind Question Box is that many barriers keep most 
of the developing world from taking advantage of the wealth of knowledge 
available through internet search engines [..] could be a drag on economic 
development. In this way we are helping farmers make decisions regarding 
where to sell, what to plant and how to best take care for their crops. It’s all 
about giving communities the ability to help themselves.”
22 
Across the African continent the economic benefits of telecommunication 
networks are now common knowledge, even among politicians, illustrated by a 
keen move from the government of Rwanda.  “..technology is the core of 
Rwanda’s plan to transform its economy by 2020. The country seems ready to 
back its ambition with money and policies. By 2012, for instance, Rwanda 
wants every child in the country between the ages of nine and 12, 1.3 m 
children in all, to have a laptop, each with an internet or intranet connection to 
download free educational software and electronic books.”
23 
The   Economist   highlights   a   further   revolutionary   development   regarding 
mobile phones in emerging markets: Enabling banking for the unbanked
24. 
Already tested successfully are the mobile money service M-Pesa in Kenya, 
deployed by Safarikom the by far largest local operator. In Uganda the figures 
posted by MTN's mobile banking service are looking good as well. MTN Mobile 
Money as the service is called had signed up more than 80,000 subscribers 
within the first four months of it's operation. The awareness about MTN's 
Mobile Money among Ugandans is at 60% according to the special report. A 
fairly prosperous example of how the establishment of one network benefits 
the emerging  of another kind of network.  Whereby  the second  one  can 
leverage   on   the   existing   network   and   increase   the   overall   utility   of   it's 
consumers.
22Nixon, Ron. The New York Times.  Dialing for Answers Where Web Can’t Reach. 
September 27, 2009 
23Rwanda's   laptop   revolution:   Upgrading   the   children.   A   pioneering   scheme   to 
computerise a whole people. The Economist. December 3rd 2009
24Standage, Tom. Special Report on telecoms in emerging markets: Beyond voice. The 
Economist. September 26
th to October 2
nd 2009. 
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These positive network externalities are perceived very high in value as the 
following example illustrates
25. In many SSA countries the expenditures for 
mobile telecommunication surpasses 50% of the disposable individual income. 
In Benin the monthly average mobile expenditure is 8.33US$ whereas the 
monthly  disposable  income  is only 16.63US$.  Botswana,  Cameroon,  Côte 
d'Ivoir, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia all surpass this 50% barrier. 
This is even more surprising when the high price sensitivity in Africa is taken 
into account. A impressive visualization of the impact of all of the above 
arguments is plotted into the following graph. 
To witch extent this growth has leaped forward in Nigeria, has recently been 
expressed during the Nigerian Information Technology and Telecom Awards by 
Ernest   Ndukwe,   Executive   Vice   Chairman   of   the   Nigeria   Communications 
Commission:
25Gillwald,   Alison.   Stork,   Christoph.  Towards   Evidence-based   ICT   Policy   and 
Regulation: ICT access and usage 
     in Africa . Volume One 2008 Policy Paper Two. Page 13.
11
Illustration 4: ICT developments in Africa, 1998-2008 penetration rate. Source: ITU 
World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators database.1   Telecommunication: A Brief Overview
“In Nigeria , an average growth of over 8.5 million lines per annum 
has been recorded from 2001 to 2009. Increase in teledensity from 
about 0.4 percent in 2000 to over 50 percent by October 2009. As in 
September, we crossed the 70 million mark in terms of connected 
lines. Internet connectivity is now in several cities across the country, 
computer and internet connectivity are in schools and colleges and 
tertiary institutions in the country.”
26
1.3.1  Generic Foreign Direct Investment
The common perception of Africa as the least developed continent, home to 
political regimes with substantial political, economic and judicial uncertainty 
and instability has long kept foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa at a low 
level. Although the absolute value of FDI increased “from an annual average of 
almost $1.9 billion in 1983–1987 to $3.1 billion in 1988–1992 and $6.0 billion 
in 1993–1997 ”
27 Africa's global share of FDI has decreased steadily.
26Ndukwe,   Ernest.   Executive   Vice   Chairman   of   the   Nigeria   Communications 
Commission.  Nigeria   is   leading   destination   for   technology   FDI.  Business   Day 
Newspaper, November 24
th 2009. Lagos. Nigeria.
27Odenthal,   Ludger  et al.  Foreign   Direct  Investment   in  Africa:   Performance   and 
Potential. UNCTAD. 1999
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This   pattern   has   undergone   a   significant   change   since   the   turn   of   the 
millennium to hit a new high water mark for FDI in 2007 with 53 Billion US$ 
according to the World Investment Report 2008
28. 
1.3.2  FDI in African Mobile Telecommunication
First, there is a continued amelioration in the conditions of doing business 
across   Africa.   Economic   and   political   reforms   have   swept   away   many 
stumbling blocks, thereby favoring new ventures and fostering regional and 
interregional trade. The Mo Ibrahim Index, created in 2007 by Dr. Mohamed 
Ibrahim, a mobile communications entrepreneur and founder of Celtel, ranks 
and classifies the performance  of all African countries according to their 
governance, security, corruption and respecting of human rights. For the best 
achievements the winning head of state is decorated by the Ibrahim Prize. It 
consists of a payment of 5 Million US$ over 10 years and 200,000 US$ 
annually for life thereafter, to the winning nations president. It is the largest 
annually awarded prize in the world and a thus a strong incentive for good 
governance. 
Second, one can notice a strong rise in cross border investments in SSA by 
African, Arabic and international companies. Among the 15 largest foreign 
investors over the ten year period from 1996 to 2006, there are only two 
companies who did not spend their entire African related investment budget 
on   the   telecommunication   sector.   For   Bouygues,   a   French   industrial 
conglomerate,   it   is   quite   unusual   to   have   not   invested   into   the   African 
telecommunication market, as this sector is among the cornerstones of its 
activities.
28World Investment Report 2008: Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure 
Challenge. Geneva. United Nations. UNCTAD. September 2008
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The African continent as such has huge deficits in infrastructure deployment. 
This is a major break on regional and interregional economic development, 
especially   for   landlocked   countries.   Following   the   price   spike   in   global 
commodities, China has increased it's influence in Africa by signing many 
trade deals aimed at the vast and diverse natural resources many countries 
possess.   Copper   from   Zambia,  Oil   from   Nigeria,   radioactive   ores   for   the 
generation nuclear fuels from Namibia, bauxite, the most important ore for the 
production of aluminum from Guinea (Conakry). The list is endless. Many 
western nations have had a dislike of Chinas massive campaigning, may it be 
because they were too late or simply because they feared the risks involved in 
doing business in Africa. Chinese business practices aside, the trade deals with 
Africa have not only brought huge sums of cash into the financial systems of 
governments   ranging   on   a   scale   form   democracy   (Ghana)   to   military 
dictatorship (Guinea), but they have brought new infrastructure into many 
countries. Roads, pipelines, mines and railways are durable investments that 
will help prosper a diverse mixture of other businesses. Somehow the largest 
chunk of FDI (excluding Sovereign investors notably Chinese) was aimed at the 
telecommunication sector of the mobile sort. So for some good reasons this 
sector must have offered a comparative advantage to its investors compared 
to other  sectors investment opportunities. The quintessence derived form the 
14
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great   amount   of   money   that   has   flown,   and   still   flows   into   mobile 
telecommunication in Africa, is that these decisions were driven by economic 
reasoning. Thus the investment decisions that were undertaken must have 
included precise expectations regarding medium to long term profits as well as 
a long term market vision. A vision that then resulted in the construction of a 
new network, which Africans were lacking.
With this brief overview of some key areas of the latest developments in the 
African telecommunication landscape we now enter the next part with a 
scientific model of game theory, dealing with a competition of two firms in a 
network industry such as the mobile telecommunication, just discussed.
2  The Network Pricing Game
The present chapter will introduce you to the theory of the Network Pricing 
Game, that will be encountered in its two different forms. One, the static 
Network Pricing Game and two, the dynamic Network Pricing Game, hereafter 
referred   to   by   NPG.   This   specific   model   has   been   chosen   for   its   many 
advantageous   characteristics   which   enable   its   application   to   African 
Telecommunication markets and the competition between the major players in 
each country. Competition in a market requires that markets have been 
opened for competition by the local telecommunications authority in the first 
place. The NPG will formally explain the possible conditional outcomes of 
market structures from competition in network industries. We will see that 
in“[...] some markets, intervention may be unnecessary for competition. It is 
likely that in the absence of regulation, some network markets will end in 
monopoly  and others will  sustain  competition,  based on their  underlying 
characteristics.”
29 
29Gideon, Dr. Carolyn.  The  Potential  for Competition  in Network  Communication 
Industries. The Fletcher School, Tufts University. Medford, Massachusetts, USA. 2004. 
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2.1  Networks
A networks fundamental characteristic is its function in enabling the formation 
and existence of connections, referred to as links, too. Further a network may 
be built on a technology and consist, for example, of a telegraphic land line 
connected   to   electric   telegraphs   along   the   way.   Operated   by   a   person 
proficient   in   morse   code,   they   enabled   people   in   distant   towns   to 
communicate without taking the burden of a long travel. This cut town the 
risks of traveling several days by horse or by steam train.
Slightly older networks of a different sort were constituted by marriage. Jet 
networks based on technological evolution are only one of many examples. 
Certainly the predominant networks of our modern society are driven by 
technology. However social networks, connecting people, are the essence of 
all networks and are enabled by the combination of social and technology 
networks. A famous historical example of a social network in the 15
th century 
is   the   one   of   Florentine   Marriages
30.   Through   strategic   advantageous 
marriages the Medici family rose to a center position in both the economic and 
political   Florentine   networks   of   ruling   families.   A   success   built   on   an 
outstanding   number   of   direct   blood-line   linkage   to   the   powerful
31  and 
influential of their time. No other ruling family in the 15
th century Florence had 
more direct links.
Networks   come   with   numerous   advantages.   To   the   Medici   their   network 
increased  their ruling power through the influence on political  and trade 
decisions. A power they used to pursue the objectives of their time, notably in 
the development and sponsorship of artists, fine art and architecture.
30Jackson, Matthew O.  Social and Economic Networks.  Princeton University Press. 
Princeton and Oxford. 2008
31Padgett, J.F., Ansell, C.K..  Robust Action on the Rise of the Medici, 1400 – 1434. 
American Journal of Sociology. No 98. 1993.
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2.1.1  Modeling   the   potential   for   competition   in 
Network Communication Industries
32
The prevention of monopolies in network based industries is among the top 
priorities of most global economies who have established appropriate bodies 
to watch sectors showing the characteristics of a market with a high potential 
of   being   monopolized.   The   key   metrics   include   technological   leadership, 
market share, pricing and pricing power as well as high price differences
33 for 
similar products or services in different markets, to which one refers to as 
marking   to   market.   The   logical   interpretation   of   marking   to   market   is 
characterized   by   a   high   monopolistic   pricing   policy   in   markets   where   a 
company owns a high market share, as opposed to a very aggressive pricing 
strategy in competitive environments. A regularly occurrence of this strategy 
can be seen, where products are sold below production costs to gain market 
share and hence distress or ruin competitors who may not be able to face a 
price  war over a longer period
34. The perused  goal  is to get rid  of the 
competition, to subsequently reign in a specific product category or market
35. 
We now approach the framework of the Network Pricing Game (NPG) to 
“...develop a theoretical basis for understanding when network competition is 
sustainable, and when regulation will be beneficial to achieving sustainable 
network competition.”
36  A competition, needed for a continued increase in 
welfare, as discussed in the final part of this thesis.
32Gideon, Dr. Carolyn.  The  Potential  for Competition  in Network  Communication 
Industries. The Fletcher School, Tufts University. Medford, Massachusetts, USA. 2004. 
33Price differences have to be determined with the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), 
taking into account the long term exchange rate equilibrium between two economies. 
This equilibrium should in theory result in one price for a good, the “law of one price”. 
34“306,85 US-Dollar Verlust pro Gerät hat Sony laut Medienberichten direkt nach dem 
Verkaufsstart der Playstation 3 gemacht...” Steinlechner, Peter. Bericht: Noch 37 US-
Dollar Zuschuss pro Playstation 3. Golem.de. Klaß & Ihlenfeld Verlag. 15.12.2009.
35A famous example is Microsoft Inc. who successfully imposed itself over the Mac and 
it's Operating System. The latter was the first to feature a graphical user interface in 
1984, at a time when Microsoft's MS Dos running on an IBM computer was still based 
on a command line interface. Bill gates later copied and marketed this approach very 
successfully. 
36Gideon, Dr. Carolyn.  The  Potential  for Competition  in Network  Communication 
Industries. The Fletcher School, Tufts University. Medford, Massachusetts, USA. 2004. 
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This  part   is  based   on   the   dissertation   “The   Potential   for   Competition   in 
Network Communication Industries” written by Dr. Carolyn Gideon
37 and builds 
on a model of competing networks, developed by Laffont, Rey and Tirole
38, 
whose model assumptions
39  are altered to question their conclusion of a 
symmetric equilibrium and a resulting symmetric duopoly. Their results appear 
questionable as companies involved in network industries start operating from 
very asymmetric positions. The likelihood of reaching an equilibrium from any 
possible market allocation is thus counterintuitive. Further critique on the 
model of Laffont, Rey and Tirole is addressed to the lack of a possible exit of 
one competitor neglecting one essential character of a competitive market as 
to when the bigger firm might attempt to induce the small firm to exit the 
market. How close in size must the firms be at the beginning of the game in 
order to reach the symmetric equilibrium? These issues are addressed by 
extending the model by Laffont, Rey and Tirole. 
With every theory come different abstractions from reality for the ease of use. 
The   key   assumptions   for   the   following   discussion   of   the   NPG   are   an 
unregulated  price  competition   between  asymmetric  networks.  Further  Dr. 
Carolyn Gideon depicts six elements within her framework which she refers to 
as (1) exit decision, (2) market solutions without the intervention of regulation, 
(3)   market   maturity,  (4)  asymmetry  in  the  sizes  of  the   firms,  (5)  inter-
connectedness and (6) subscribers innate hesitancy to switch networks.
To address the challenges arising from a sustainable competition, this model 
considers the market after entry to see when a small rival can survive and stay 
in the market, and when it will be forced to exit by its bigger rival. Therefore 
the importance of promoting competition through incentive policies should 
thus not only focus on inducing market entry, but assure that efficient entrants 
survive in the market, something that calls for regulation. The question here is 
what is the best form of regulation and when should it be used. To find an 
answer to this question the author proposes to “...consider the market solution 
37Gideon, Dr. Carolyn.  The  Potential  for Competition  in Network  Communication 
Industries. The Fletcher School, Tufts University. Medford, Massachusetts, USA. 2004
38Laffont,Jean-Jacques. Rey, Patrick. Tirole, Jean.  Network Competition: I. Overview 
and Nondiscriminatory Pricing.  RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, 
vol. 29(1), pages 1-37, 1998.
39Price competition between two networks in the market, no regulation of retail prices, 
some fixed interconnection price and consumers choosing between  networks.
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if firms simply maximize their profits absent price regulation
40.”  This shall 
allow to observe the firms strategic behavior and pricing in order to determine 
the   natural   outcome.   In   a   second   step   the   outcome   is   subjected   to   a 
backwards induction to understand when regulation is needed and what it 
should target to change the natural and unwanted course of unsustainable 
competition   in   a   network   industry.   It   may   for   example   be   necessary   to 
regulate a market in a very early stage, even when competition is flourishing 
as “...apparent competition in an immature industry may simply reflect growth 
in   the   market.   Once   the   market   matures   and   the   growth   has   abated, 
consolidation becomes a more prominent issue.
40 ” 
This argument is of special interest for Africa, as currently telecommunication 
markets grow at high rates with the first countries, notably South Africa, 
reaching the 100% saturation level. A level at which consolidation becomes 
very likely, as further growth in the customers base can best be achieved by 
acquiring   a   competitor   and   combining   both   companies.   Gains   are   made 
through  economies of scale, a better use of infrastructures and the possible 
use of new frequencies through the acquired companies mobile licenses. 
To circumvent the difficulty of taking an apparent competition into account 
“the model developed below assumes a mature market that no longer is 
experiencing growth in subscribers, leaving the firms to compete only for each 
other’s installed base of customers.
40” Further the model assumes asymmetry 
in the size of the firms competing against each other. Gideon mentions the 
findings of Laffont, Rey and Tirole
38  show that a symmetric competition is 
sustainable. Yet she complains  “[...] it is not clear how a market becomes 
symmetric, and if the symmetric case is always possible  
40”  and highlights 
research done by Sherpard
41 who discusses market dominance as a barrier to 
entry for network industries. Gabel
42 and Bernard, Ford and Spiwak
43 share this 
40cp Gideon, p 5
41Shepherd, William G. Problems in Creating Effective Competition. Opening Networks 
to Competition: The Regulation and Pricing of Access.  Edited by David Gabel and 
David F. Weiman. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1998.
42Gabel,   David.  Why   is   there   so   little   competition   in   the   provision   of   local 
telecommunications   services?  Paper   Presented   at   The   30th   Telecommunications 
Policy Research Conference, Alexandria, VA, September 2002. 
43Beard, Ford and Spiwak.. Why ADCo? Why now? An economic exploration into the 
future of industry structure for the ‘last mile’ in telecommunications markets. Policy 
paper number 12, Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy 
Studies. November 2001. 
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view in their findings from local telephone markets, where “...entrants facing 
incumbent monopolies find it difficult to gain sufficient market share to realize 
scale  economies quickly enough to compete.
40”  Thus there  must exist a 
certain level of market concentration, that if attained by one firm, prevents 
any other firm from competing successfully. Thus leaving no margin for the 
survival of an entrant, according to Gideon.
Her model assumes the networks of the competing firms to be interconnected, 
covering   the   entire   country.   Reciprocal   compensation   for   access   and 
proportional traffic are assumed, resulting in zero net payments between the 
firms. Network externalities are eliminated by this assumption, leaving the 
subscriber choice between networks to be based on price differences and the 
subscriber’s innate propensity to switch networks for a given price difference. 
As Gideon mentions, this gives competition the full attention and makes it 
harder to prove competition is unsustainable. Otherwise existing network 
externalities would further dampen the expectations of the smaller competitor 
to survive in the market. 
She assumes customers to be hesitant to switch providers, even when another 
network offers a lower price. Factors such as the reputation of the current 
provider as well as the inconvenience to change the current network provider 
are hereby taken into account. Yet it is important to note that customers are 
not locked in. 
For   the   purposes   of   her   paper,   Gideon   defines   a   network   market   as   a 
geographic market where  a network service  is provided to customers. A 
network service is a service that, in order to be provided to a given end user, 
must be connected to the other end users, where an end user may be a 
content or application provider. In this paper, these markets are characterized 
by: (1) single subscribership, meaning customers will not subscribe to multiple 
providers; (2) large sunk costs of entry, severely limiting the number of 
competitors; and (3) a limited, defined geographic area.
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2.2  The Static Network Pricing Game
For a clear view on the NPG's here it's key assumptions presented in a 
compact list: 
(a) Model of price competition between two network firms
(b) Both firms cover the same, given geographic market
(c) Firm 1 is slightly larger
44 than Firm 2
(d) Firm 1 never exits while Firm 2 will exit if it can not earn positive profits
(e) The market is mature reflected in a fixed number of subscribers
(f) There   is   a   monopoly   price   a   firm   can   charge   without   alienating 
subscribers
(g) Demand is price inelastic below the monopoly price
(h) Before the game, subscribers are allocated between the firms by an 
exogenous process
45
(i) Subscribers switch networks depending on price differences, yet show 
an initial hesitation of doing so
(j) Marginal costs of both firms are equal
(k) All sunk costs of entry are made prior to the beginning of the game
(l) Fix costs are equal for both firms, as they both have to maintain the 
same network size
(m) The fixed costs per market subscriber in each period are recurring 
costs of business and are not sensitive to traffic or the number of 
subscribers – eliminating efficiency gains
(n) The networks of the firms are fully interconnected – eliminating network 
externalities
44The term large is coined on the share of the total market it serves.
45To come with an African example, one may think of the allocation of frequencies. A 
procedure conducted openly through auction in some countries and through relations, 
bribes and misuse of political power in other countries. 
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(o) Interconnection between networks is mandatory an comes with a fixed 
symmetrical price with reciprocal compensation resulting in zero net 
payments between the firms
46
Prices are set by the firms sequentially in a Stackelberg
47 game with Firm 1 as 
the first mover. The one period NPG consists of three stages. In Stage 1, the 
firms learn their initial market share allocations, and Firm 2 decides to exit or 
stay in the market based on this information and the characteristics of the 
market. In Stage 2, Firm 1 sets its price. In Stage 3, Firm 2 sets its price in 
response to Firm 1’s price, if it is still in the market. Subscribers then choose 
to   switch   networks   or   stay   with   their   current   providers,   and   service   is 
purchased, according to Gideon. 
She characterizes markets by four parameters:
(1)  ∈ [0,1)  with    as the subscribers' propensity to switch networks for a 
given difference in prices
(2) c  as the marginal cost of providing service to a customer
(3) F  as the fixed cost of providing service in the market per subscriber
(4) P
M  as the monopoly price, the maximum price before customers start 
to disconnect
Following assumption (h) the initial market share is allocated by an exogenous 
process resulting in a slightly bigger share of the market for Firm 1. It's initial 
market share is denoted by   0  0.5, 1   while Firm 2 has  the remaining 
initial share of the market  α−0=1–α0 . Both firms know that their initial 
market share will change according to their set price and the customers 
propensity to switch. The function describing this adjustment process is:
46Calling between the networks is assumed to be proportional, meaning that each 
customer is equally likely to call any other subscriber in the market.13 A network with 
70% market share will find 70% of calls originating on its network terminate on its 
network, while 30% of the calls made by its customers are terminated on the rival’s 
network. Likewise, this network will receive as incoming 70% of the calls made by its 
rival’s subscribers. 
47A Stackelberg 
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1=0− p1− p2, for 0   1
As one would suggest, is the adjusted market share, after the subscribers have 
reacted to the pricing of the firms, taking into account their willingness to 
change. Intuitively one can see how a difference in prices translates into a 
change of market share. 
Both firms maximize their profits. The profit functions are 
1=0−p1− p2 p1−c−F  for Firm 1 and
2 =1−0P1−P2P2−c−F for Firm 2.
To solve this maximization problem we need to find the optimal response of 
Firm 2 to the price set by Firm 1 and integrate this into the profit function of 
Firm 1. This is an advantage of the sequential nature of the Stackelberg game.
To do so we take the first partial derivation of the profit function of Firm 2 with 
respect to the price of Firm 2 and set it equal to zero 
∂2
∂ p2
= 0 . By rearranging 
the result we receive the best response function of Firm 2 on the price of Firm 
1, given Firm 2 has chosen to stay in the market:
p2 = 1
2
 c 
1−0

 p1  .
In a second step this best response rule of Firm 2 is inserted into the profit 
equation of Firm 1. Thereafter we build the partial derivation to p1 and set this 
equal to zero to receive, after a rearranging the terms, the price that 
maximizes the profits of Firm 1 for the single period game.
p1
* = c 
01
2
The same approach is used for Firm 2. This time we take the best price for 
Firm 1 and set it into the profit function of Firm 2. A partial derivation of this 
function to the price of Firm 2 yields after solving the maximization problem 
the best prise Firm 2 can achieve when Firm 1 maximizes its profit.
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p2
* = c 
3−0
4
These results are all conditional on Firm 2 deciding to stay in the market. With 
the calculated prices it is now possible to compute the profits of both network 
operators. The profit of Firm 1, given Firm 2 stays in the market is
1=
0  1
2
8
− F and the profit of Firm 2 is 2 =
3− 0
2
16
− F given Firm 2 
decides to stay in the market.
The above results assume Firm 2 decides in stage one of the single period 
game to stay in the market. Given Firm 2 would choose exit in stage one the 
trivial result would be a monopoly for Firm 1 with  profits of  1= P
M − c − F  
and  2
Out = 0  for Firm 2.
Gideon mentions the existence of a positive correlation between the size of 
the initial market share and the firms profits. Starting from the profit functions 
of Firm 1 and Firm 2 we can show this by a partial derivation of these 
equations to their respective market share. These are strictly positive, hence a 
growth in market share results in an increase of profits.
As for Firm 1
∂1
∂1
=
01
4
 0 and for Firm 2
∂2
∂−0
=
2−0
8
 0 .
With this lead at hand we want to find out more about the critical market share 
needed for Firm 2 to allow it survive the competition against the advantaged 
Firm 1. As noted before Firm 2 will drop out if it can not earn a positive profit 
and Firm 1 receives per default a larger share of the market than Firm2. 
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To find this market share threshold that Gideon denotes with  * , we have to 
take the profit function of Firm 2 and set this equal to zero in order to solve it 
for   . A market share above this value allows a survival, a value at or below it 
will bring death to the network operator. 
2 =
3 − 0
2
16
− F setting 2= 0  0 = 3 −4 F
Yet this denotes the market market share of Firm 1, so we need to make use 
of   α−0=1–α0  to find the alpha of Firm 2:
−0= 4 F − 2 = * .
As we can observe, the fate of Firm 2 does not depend on either its own not 
the price of its rival, but on the fixed costs of operating the network and the 
propensity of switching networks of the customers in the geographic market. 
One conclusion of this characteristic is that the firm, once it knows weather its 
market share is at or below the critical level, cannot change its destiny by 
increasing or decreasing its price. If it tightens the price for its service, 
customers will change to the rival network. Higher earnings per customer will 
not outbalance the losses in the total customer base resulting in less earnings. 
A   decrease   in   price   may   not   help   either   as   the   fall   in   earnings   is   not 
compensated by a growing customer base. The two main characteristics of the 
market are the fixed costs and the propensity to switch. Both exert direct and 
indirect changes of behavior. The needed initial market share increases in 
both, the rise of fixed costs and a growing propensity to switch, denoting a 
higher price sensitivity of the customers. An indirect effect of a growing 
propensity,   is  a  drop   in   prices   when  the   level   of  competition  increases. 
Customers are more likely to switch for much smaller price differences, so 
both firms will adopt and compensate this effect by a drop in prices, resulting 
in lower earnings for the two companies, given Firm 2 is in the market. Hence 
knowing about these factors in a given market helps to determine how likely it 
is that the competition may end in a monopoly. 
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A much obvious measure is the critical market share  * . Gideon continues 
with a categorization of markets into three different types according to the 
values of  * .
• Sustainable Duopoly when *  0
• Inevitable Monopoly when * ≥ 0.5
• Indeterminate Markets when 0 ≤ *  0.5
For critical market shares below zero, Firm 2 will be able to survive. This is 
made possible through the right propensity to switch and the fix costs in the 
market. Even if Firm 2 starts with zero initial market share, it will be able to 
attract customers and earn enough to survive
48. Monopoly will be the outcome 
for an alpha greater than or equal to 50% of the market. A zone of uncertainty 
about the outcome is located between zero and 50% market share.
A use of these findings could be applied to market regulation. When enough 
market data is available, notably about the propensity to switch and the fix 
costs of providing service, the computation of the above values should pose 
no   problems.   For   Sub   Saharan   Africa   one   should   assume   a   very   high 
propensity to switch, when only taking the price of service into account. A 
marginal change in price gives a reason to substantial savings by switching 
between providers, as the income level is generally low. Due to these very low 
average income levels across Africa, the predominant way of paying for phone 
calls is in advance. Consumers  purchase from single minutes to several hours 
of calling credit. With less to no money at their free disposal they exhibit a 
high price sensitivity. But the price is only one factor of the propensity to 
switch, as those willing to change their network may be confronted by other 
barriers such as a loss of their current mobile phone number and the purchase 
of a new phone card, making it much harder to get to an actual figure about 
the true propensity to switch within a market.
48Gideon explains in her foot note, a value of Fθ < 0.25 satisfies this outcome.
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However, following Gideon, some general suggestions for can be given. In a 
market with a sustainable duopoly, no regulation is needed, as competition will 
prosper. A monopoly in a market will most likely call for action, although the 
existence of a natural monopoly may not. Most interesting for further analysis 
are indeterminate markets, as these may develop into either a monopoly or a 
sustained   duopoly.   With   the   latter   being   the   preferred   outcome,   the 
indeterminate   market   calls   for   attention   and   a   possible   action   from   the 
regulatory body in charge. Any action considered by policy makers must target 
the markets underlying characteristics to decrease the critical market share 
and allow for a continuing competition among the network service providers. 
For   example,   a   government   could   require   subscribers   to   let   switching 
customers take their mobile phone numbers with them to the new provider, 
hereby increasing the overall propensity to switch whereby the critical market 
share needed to stay in the market decreases.
As Gideon points out for the static Network Pricing Game, if Firm 2 has a 
market share lager than  * , Firm 1 will take a higher price for its services. As 
the larger firm it can profit more from its larger customer base by taking a 
higher price compared to lowering the price to attract new customers. While 
affording to lose some customers seem to be bad idea, the short term result 
shows Firm 1 profits from this strategy as the partial derivation of the price 
difference with respect to the initial market share of Firm one is greater than 
zero:
p1
* − p2
* =
30− 1
4
and ∂p1
* − p2
*
∂0
= 3
4
 0 .
Even when the assumption (j) of symmetrical marginal costs is relaxed and the 
smaller firm would be given a cost advantage over Firm 1, this would not be of 
any big influence. It might help a little, but as long as the profound market 
structure persists this improvement may not be sufficient for Firm 2 to survive 
in the market, as Gideon highlights. These are the results of the static Single 
Period Network Pricing Game, showing the strong dominance of the market 
leader while the survival of the competitor depends on his initial size of market 
share and whether this is bigger than the critical share. However a game over 
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one period is a static approach. To see how robust these conclusions are we 
will put then to the test in a two period game. But before we do so, we take a 
short detour to Africa for a reality check on key assumptions of this model to 
underline   the   importance   of   efficient   regulatory   intervention   to   promote 
sustainable competition.
2.2.1  Detour: A comparison to reality in Africa I
A recent blog
49 entry by Steve Song
50, with the tittle “SMS Interconnect Fees” 
picked   up   the   topic   of 
overcharged   fees   by   network 
operators for terminating SMS 
text   messages   on   their 
networks   subscribers   phones, 
originating   from   competing 
networks. Mr. Song proclaims 
in range “In at least 17 African 
countries, operators charge an 
interconnect fee for connecting 
with other operators nationally. 
In   many   cases   they   are 
doubling even tripling the cost 
of   sending   an   SMS.     The 
argument   for   levying   an 
interconnect   charge   is   based 
on the need of the operator to 
recover   the   costs   of 
terminating   a   call   or   in   this 
case an SMS on their network. 
49Song, Steve. SMS Interconnect Fees. 20
th November 2009. Accessed online the 27
th 
November 2009 at http://manypossibilities.net/2009/11/sms-interconnect-fees/
50Steve Song is a member of the Shuttleworth Foundation and currently work on 
telecommunications and access issues in South Africa. Prior to joining the Foundation 
he spent 10 years at the International Development Research Centre in Ottawa 
funding and engaging in research into Information and Communication Technology for 
Development (ICT4D) issues, mostly in Africa.
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Table 2: Interconnection fees for text messages in 
17   African   countries.  Source:   Steve   Song, 
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But let’s face it, the incremental cost of terminating an SMS on an operator’s 
network is effectively zero or near enough to zero, as to make no difference.” 
This of course highlights a need for regulatory intervention in order to correct 
this abuse of market dominance by the dominant operator in the market. 
Table   2   above   reveals   the   urgency   of   dealing   with   these   fees   harming 
competition   and   fostering   the   positive   network   externalities   of   the   local 
market leader.
A second observation, supporting the Network Pricing Game and the tendency 
of the dominant firm to reach a monopoly can be observed in Kenya. As East 
Africans most vibrant economy with a 2008 GDP per Capita figure of 896
51 US$ 
well ahead of its neighboring countries Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, Ethiopia and 
Somalia, Kenya has also one of the most advanced mobile telecommunication 
industry in East Africa. But deregulation and privatization of public phone 
operators have not prevented the emergence of one very dominant operator: 
Safaricom. With a current market share in the Kenyan market of approximately 
77% for the year 2009, down from a top at 84% in 2008, one can observe the 
tendency of the market leader to charge its customers a higher price, to 
capitalize on its large number of subscribers. A country comparison of local 
minimum wages per day and the amount of mobile phone minutes and text 
messages this minimum wage can buy gives a good insight. Illustration 7 on 
the next page is backed by a table of data, accessible in the annex A.2 under 
the topic “Cheap Talk?”. There you can find further data such as the actual 
minimum wage in local currency as well as the number of text messages 
affordable for a days work.
51World Bank figures. 2008
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A days work at the minimum wage in Kenya earns approximately 148.64 
Kenyan Shillings. This amount of money would be completely consumed by 
only 9 minutes 50 seconds of mobile phone calls to rival networks or 30 SMS 
text   messages   terminating   on   handsets   of   rival   network   operators.   This 
example   presumes   a   subscription   with   Safaricom   to   originate   calls   and 
messages to other Kenyan networks. 
The   Kenyan   Government   seems   to   have   understood   the   urgency   of 
maintaining competition in its local market by pushing reforms to modernize 
competition in telecommunication industries, as a Reuters press release can 
indirectly confirm: “East Africa's biggest firm by market capitalization said in 
March 2009 that its market share had dropped to about 77 percent from 84 
percent at the end of March 2008 as a result of aggressive competition from 
rivals Orange, controlled by France Telecom and Kuwaiti-listed Zain
52”
We now return to Gideons theory of the Network Pricing Game. This time the 
dynamic two period competition will be analyzed.
52Nyambura-Mwaura, Helen. Safaricom investors eyeing market share, ARPU. Reuters 
News Agency. Nairobi, Kenya. May 18
th  2009.
30
Illustration  7: Number of call minutes a days work will earn you at 
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2.3  The Dynamic Network Pricing Game
With the two period Network Pricing Game a new dynamic will enter into the 
equations, as both firms now have to consider their actions and strategies in 
period one with respect to period two. As before prior to period one the market 
shares will be attributed by a non-observable exogenous process. Both firms 
then have to decide if they want to grow their market share or even try to 
force the smaller firm out of the market in order to obtain a monopoly in 
period two. The sub-game in period two is then equivalent to the static NPG. 
To allow for a clearer picture of the dynamic game we first have a look at the 
stages and actions, in the two periods and their sequence.
Period Stage Action
1
1 Firms learn about their initial market share allocations
2 Firm 1 sets its price
3 Firm 2 sets its price. Thereafter subscribers stay or 
switch and purchase  the services from their chosen 
service provider 
2
1 Firm 2 chooses to stay IN the market or drop OUT
2 Firm 1 sets its price
3 Firm 2 sets its price. Thereafter subscribers stay or 
switch and purchase  the services from their chosen 
service provider
Table 3: The Two Period Network Pricing Game. Source: Gideon, p.12.
As Gideon points out, both firms learn about their market share in stage one of 
period one. Then the by definition larger Firm 1 sets its price, where after Firm 
2 sets its price and customers switch and purchase services from either of 
both firms, dependent on pricing and the markets fundamental characteristics. 
Arriving in period two of the game, Firm 2 has the choice to exit or stay in the 
market, hereafter Firm 1 sets its price. In the last stage Firm 2 sets its price 
and again customers chose their provider and purchase service. The game 
ends.
With the game in period two being contingent on the firms actions in period 
one, each competitor can now make use of strategic actions to maximize it's 
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profits. However the availability of strategies and their usefulness depend on 
the market conditions. These are determined by specific combinations of fixed 
costs and the propensity to switch.
If, for example, the critical market share threshold required Firm 2 to have a 
market share larger than 50% to earn positive profits, Firm 2 would never be 
able to survive and compete over two periods and thus always would exit in 
period two. This would make the market outcome an inevitable monopoly. If, 
for instance, the underlying market conditions allow Firm 2 to generate profits, 
even in the case when its initial market share is zero, then a duopoly will 
emerge no matter what action is taken by Firm 1. Thus firm 2 will always 
survive in period two and never drop out due to Firm 1's actions.
Thus, as Gideon concludes, the only interesting market is the intermediate 
one, where in period one it is not clear if the market outcome will be a 
monopoly or a duopoly. As in the one period game the resulting market 
structure will again depend on the market's underlying characteristics and the 
initial market share allocations. The decision of Firm 2 to stay in the market or 
exit is based on the price Firm 1 sets for the first period. This price then serves 
Firm 2 as an indication to whether it will have to exit in period two of the 
game. Hence Firm 2 will choose its price to either maximize profits over two 
periods, when Firm 1's price allows it to coexist, or maximize profits for only 
one period, if Firm 1 seeks the monopoly in period two and market conditions 
allow for this to happen.
With the price set by Firm 1 in period one being the critical parameter 
regarding the survival of Firm 2 in the second period, we seek to find the value 
this parameter needs to take, so that Firm 2 is indifferent between staying and 
exiting the competition. Reformulated we could ask, which price Firm 1 must 
choose in period one, so that the resulting shift in market share results in 
conditions, where Firm 2 in period two can earn a profit of zero at best.
Based on Firm 1's price in period one, denoted as  P11 , Firm 2 can choose IN 
and stay in for both periods, or choose OUT and exit in the beginning of period 
2. Thus Firm 2 must maximize its profit over two periods, given Firm 1's price. 
For reasons of simplification, there is no rate of interest nor inflation with the 
handy result that earnings in period one and period two must not be subjected 
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to a net present value calculus and can simply be added. Noted below is the 
simplified equation expressing the total profit for Firm 2 as a summation of its 
profits in period one and two. The index T-1 denotes the first period and T-0 
the second period, just an infinite little moment before the game ends in T.
i. 2
T = 2
T−12
T−0
2
T−1  is now replaced by the profit function we have been maximizing for Firm 
2 in the single period game:  2
T−1= 2 = 1−0p1− p2 p2−c−F , whereas 
the second term  2
T−0  is replaced by Firm 2's equilibrium duopoly profit
53. It is 
derived   from   the   duopoly   market   outcome   of   the   single   period   game. 
Following is the illustrated of the above described steps.
ii.  2
T = 1−0P11−P 21P21−c−F
iii.  2
T = 1−0 P11−P 21P21−c−F
3−0
2
16
−F
However the static oligopoly game profit did not account for a second period 
adjustment of market shares as a result of the combined impact of customers 
propensity to switch and the actual price difference of both operators. Hence 
one has to add the market share adjustment  P11−P21  to the equation, as 
highlighted   in   red   below.   Now   the   new   profit   function   is   ready   for   the 
optimization process.
iv.  2
T = 1−0 P11−P 21P21−c−F 1
16
3−0P11−P21
2−F
The  next  step  is  to find  the   maximum  of  the   profits  over  both periods 
depending on the price set by Firm 2 in period one, as expressed by the next 
equation.
v.  Max
P 21
2
T = 1−0P11−P21P21−c−F
1
16
3−0P11−P21
2−F
To solve this maximization its necessary to build the partial derivation of Firm 
2's profit function with respect to the price of Firm 2, as this is the only levy it 
53Duopoly Profit of Firm 2: 2 =
3− 0
2
16
− F
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can tweak, while all other factors and characteristics are either given by the 
market conditions or induced by Firm 1.
vi. 
∂2
T
∂P 21
= −
15 P21
8

5−70
8

7 P11
8
 c = 0
54
It follows the best price Firm 2 can choose to maximize its profits over two 
periods of the game for any given price of Firm 1, given Firm 2 can stay in the 
market in period two.
vii.  P21
INP11=− 1
15
8c
5 − 70

 7P11
By inserting the price obtained above into Firm 2's profit equation (iv.) we 
obtain the total game profits of Firm 2 when this is choosing to stay IN, in the 
second period.
viii.  21
T - INP11 = 1
225
10−8o8P11−c 1
16

40−80
15
 8
15
P11−c
2
−2F
As there is just one other choice for Firm 2, of only competing in the first 
period of the game, one can return to the one period game and reuse the 
earlier obtained results. We recall Firm 2's single period profit function and 
rewrite the optimal price in equation xii. as the price Firm 2 will pick when it 
chooses to exit in period two:
ix.  2 =1−0P1−P2P2−c−F
x.  Max
P 21
2 = 1−0P11−P21P21−c−F
xi. 
∂21
∂P 21
= −P21−c 1 − 0P11 − P21= 0
xii.  P21
OUTP11 = 1
2
c
1−0

P11
54Calculus involved to arrive from v. to vi. and vii. is extensive and has been done on 
paper in order to follow the reasoning of Gideon and her approach. To keep focused 
on the interesting figures, without blowing up the amount of mathematic calculus, the 
side line operations will not be shown here, but can be provided on request.
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This is the best price Firm 2 can set if it knows it will exit at the beginning of 
period two. Inserting it once again into the known profit function yields us: 
xiii.  2
T- OUTP11 =
1
4
1−0P11−c
2−F
As we seek to find the overall benefit Firm 2 enjoys form choosing to stay IN in 
the second period of the  game, a subtraction of equation xiii. from equation 
viii. reveals this net benefit. 
xiv. 
2
T - IN−2
T - OUT= 5
12

40
2
15
−
0
2
4
−
0
60

5−0P11−c
30
c
2
60
−
P11c
30

P11
2
60
−F
In a next step it is important to understand, when Firm 2 will rather choose to 
exit in period two of the game. With Firm 1 as the dominant player, we need to 
find the critical price   P11  that Firm 1 has to choose, so that Firm 2 becomes 
indifferent between staying IN and getting OUT of the competition in the 
second period of the game. Hence the above equation must equal zero. 
Solving it for the price  P11  set by Firm 1 in period we obtain
xv.  P11 = c
0−5

215F 

.
At this price of Firm 1, Firm 2 will be indifferent between remaining in the 
game or exiting the game in period two. Still following Gideons footsteps, its 
now time to see if Firm 2 has a financial advantage from staying in the market. 
And if so how big this is.
For Firm 2, in order to have a benefit from choosing IN in period two, the first 
derivative of the  differential equation  2
T - IN − 2
T - OUT  must be larger than or at 
least equal to zero.
xvi. 
∂2
T - IN − 2
T - OUT
∂P11
≥ 0
xvii. 
∂2
T - IN − 2
T - OUT
∂P11
=
5−0
30
− c
30
 
30
P11 ≥ 0 
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Therefore Firm 2 will stay in the market in period two, if the price set by its 
bigger rival is larger than 
xviii.  P11 ≥ c 
0−5

and from the second partial derivation of xiv. we can conclude that Firm 2's 
premium for choosing IN is increasing in  P11  for all  P11 ≥ c 
0−5

.
xix. 
∂
22
T - IN − 2
T - OUT
∂ P11
2 = 2
60
≥ 0
We can now conclude Firm 2's actions accordingly. Firm 2 will choose to EXIT 
the competition when Firm 1 sets a price lower than or equal to    P11   and 
remain IN if the price is larger than   P11 .
With these results it is now possible to formulate the best response rules for 
Firm 2 in period one of the dynamic NPG: 
➔ If Firm 1 chooses  P11  c
0−5

215F 

, then Firm 2 chooses IN for 
Period two and set own price to
P21
INP11=− 1
15
8c
5 − 70

 7P11 .
➔ If Firm 1 chooses  P11 ≤ c
0−5

215F 

, then Firm 2 chooses OUT 
in Period two and set own price to
P21
OUTP11 = 1
2
c
1−0

P11 .
On the next side you find the graphical pendant of Firm 2's best response 
rules. With the red shaded area indicating Firm 2's exit in period two for given 
prices of Firm 1 and the green area marking prices of Firm 1 allowing Firm 2 to 
earn a positive return and stay in the market. 
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The first mover advantage of Firm 1 choosing its price first, combined with its 
advantage in initial market share allocation yields a clear result: Firm 1 can 
influence the market structure as it chooses its price. Further it can take into 
account Firm 2's response in strategy and price, depending on its own pricing.
Knowing all about Firm 2's strategies, we shall now find out more about Firm 
1's strategies and the attempt to maximize its profits over two periods. Gideon 
formulates in her proposition 6  “[...] that for high values of Firm 1's initial 
market share, such that   0 ≥ 11 − 415F  , Firm 1's optimal price in the 
static sequential game is a price that will induce Firm 2’s exit in the dynamic 
sequential network pricing game. When this price induces Firm 2’s exit in the 
dynamic sequential game, it is Firm 1’s optimal exit-inducement price.
55” And 
an exit of Firm 2 is the best Firm 1 can achieve as it will be able to charge the 
maximum price from the market in period 2: the monopoly price. From the 
55Gideon, p.14
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best response rules of Firm 2 we already know that Firm 1 holds all aces on its 
hand. It now only needs to play them. 
Assuming Firm 2 exits the competition in period two, the profit function of Firm 
1 for two periods is
I. 1
T = 0 − P11 − P 21
OUTP11P11−c− F  P
M − c − F .
When inserting the price of Firm 2, when it has chosen to exit the game in 
period two (xii.), into the above equation (I.) we get 
II. 1
T =
1
2
0  1− P11 − cP11 − c P
M − c − 2F .
Firm  1's goal is to earn a maximum profit over the two periods of the 
competition. Assuming its strategy is to push Firm 2 out of the market in 
period two, its best price is obtained from in IV. 
III.
∂1
T
∂P11
=−P11  c 
01
2
= 0
IV. P11 = c 
01
2
.   As   P11   is   Firm   1's   best   price   we   denote   it
P1
* = c 
01
2
.
For this price to qualify though
56, it must comply with the results derived from 
equation xv.
V. P11 ≤ c
0−5

215 F 

 
Equation V. can be rewritten by applying equation IV:
VI. c 
01
2
≤ c
0−5

215 F

.
56The underlying market conditions  like the initial market share and consumers 
propensity to switch must allow Firm 1 to price in period one in a way that maximizes 
it's own profit and despite consumers switching to Firm 2, leaves it with enough 
market share that Firm 2 will not be able to earn a profit in the second period and 
exit. 
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When rearranging VI. for  o  then we receive the necessary condition for the 
above static price IV., to maximize Firm 1's profits over two periods. It requires 
an initial market share of
     VII. 0 ≥ 11 − 415F  .
The maximum profits that can be earned by Firm 1 in Period two are monopoly 
profits. Given that Firm 1's static price induces Firm 2 to exit in Period two, 
Firm 1 cannot do better as to earn this monopoly profit in the final period of 
the game.
    VIII. 1
MAX = P
M − c − F .
And since the equation IV. denotes Firm 1's profit maximizing price in the 
static game with competition, Firm 1 cannot do any better in the dynamic 
game, than by choosing IV. as its price. The best Firm 1 can obtain in the 
second period of the game is the monopoly price. It can only ask for this price, 
when competition has ceased. At this point it is important to keep in mind, that 
there is a required threshold   o   needs to exceed, in order to making a 
monopoly  a possible market outcome.
With this result we now have a picture about Firm 1's strategy for a big initial 
market share. But what should Firm 1 do if this condition was not met and its 
attributed initial market share was situated at a lower level at the beginning of 
the two period game?
With  0 ≤ 11 − 415F   Firm 1's price will not induce Firm 2's exit in period 
two and the price set by Firm 1 will be larger than  P1
* = c 
01
2
. We thus 
need to find the new best price response of Firm 1 for the changed market 
conditions. Gideon suggests the new price will be in a range between the 
optimal static price and the highest possible price that will induce Firm 2's exit 
in period 2. As market conditions have changed the price chosen by Firm 1 will 
by default result in coexistence with Firm 2. A less desired outcome, but 
inevitable under the above assumptions. Therefore the profit maximizing price 
for Firm 1 over the two periods is the closest it can get to V. and this is, 
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indexed by EI for Exit Inducing, as its primary goal remains inducing Firm 2 to 
leave the competition, even if this is not among the set of possible outcomes 
in this particular game set. 
IX.  P11
EI = c
0−5

215 F 

. 
Any lower value of  P11  would induce exit, and any higher value would come at 
a cost for Firm 1 whose total profits decrease in a rising of its own price
57 
expressed by 
∂1
T−Coex
∂ P11
 0 . In the next step Gideon derives Firm 1's price of 
coexistence by taking the first derivative of Firm 1's two period profit function 
and solving for  P11 .
X.  1
T−Coex =
1
15
805−8P11−cP11−c
1
8

820
15
−
8
15
P11−c
2
−2F
XI. 
∂1
T−Coex
∂ P11
=
104035
225
− 224
225
P11−c 0 for P11  c 
104035
224
Therefore when 
XII.  0 
77
8
−
56
1515F  , Firm 1's price of coexistence is
XIII.  P11
Coex = c 
10435
224
.
We can thus conclude for Firm 1, when (XII.) holds, (XIII.) will not induce exit of 
Firm  2,  and   0  11 − 415F  , so   P1
*   will not induce  exit either,  and 
0  * ≤ 0.5 ,   so   both   monopoly   and   competition   are   possible   market 
outcomes, there is some value of Firm 1's initial market share allocation,   0 , 
such that Firm 1 will be indifferent between choosing among its pricing 
strategies of coexistence (Coex) and exit inducement (EI).
57Extensive proof is provided by Gideon, page 30 ff. A detailed treatment in this thesis 
seems beyond the constraint of the imposed time limit. Therefor the four remaining 
proofs are not deployed in all detail, yet its results are presented.
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Based on these results, we can now formulate the best strategies and their 
according plan of action for Firm 1 for the dynamic NPG:
If  0 ≥  0 , then Firm 1 should choose  P11
EI = c
0−5

215 F 

 as price and 
if  0   0 , then Firm 1 should choose  P11
Coex = c 
10435
224
 as its price.
For any other  0   0
58, the market outcome will be a monopoly.
The complexity involved in the above calculus may be a reason for difficulties 
in understanding the derived results. To counter these possible effects, a 
graph shall help in understanding the computed conclusions. According to 
Gideon, Firm 1 determines if it will earn higher profits from coexisting with 
Firm 2 (Coex) or from inducing Firm 2 to exit (EI). The difference between Firm 
1’s total profits for coexistence and total profits for inducing exit, is Firm 1’s 
benefit of coexistence. It is shown in the illustration below as a function of Firm 
1’s initial market share. This benefit function is monotonic and decreasing in 
the relevant range of initial market shares. Thus Firm 1’s profits from  EI 
increase relative to its profits from coexistence when Firm 1 begins the game 
with a larger market share
59.
58For your information   0 =
77
8
−
7
2 15F  − 14
4 −161115F   24P
M − 4c −15F
59Gideon, p. 15
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On the way to the final conclusion of the discussed dynamic Network Pricing 
Game, we now have a look at the decision tree of dominant player Firm 1.
When inspecting the impressive game tree of the dominant Firm 1, a central 
question may emerge: What is the likelihood of a monopoly outcome in this 
Network Pricing Game? Gideon offers us a comprehensive answer to this 
question and undermines it with mathematical proof. It culminates in her final 
proposition,   the   probability   of   monopoly.   According   to   her   calculus,   the 
probability of a monopoly increases with an increase of fixed costs F, increases 
with an increase in propensity to switch    , increases with an increase in 
monopoly price  P
M
 and decreases with an increase in marginal cost c. 
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Illustration 10: Firm 1's solution to the dynamic Network Pricing Game
* 0
0 ≤ *0.5
*≥ 0.5
0  11 − 415F 
0 ≥ 11 − 415F 
0  11 − 415F 
0 ≥ 11 − 415F 
0   0
0 ≥  0
P11 = P11
EI
P11 = P1
* = c 
0  1
2
P11 = P11
Coex
P11 = P11
Coex
P11 = P11
EI
P11 = P1
* = c 
0  1
2
Monopoly
Monopoly
Monopoly
Monopoly
Duopoly
Duopoly2   The Network Pricing Game
These results are intuitive for any economist except the one for the propensity 
to switch. When consumers are assumed to change their operator very fast, 
expectations lead to thinking this may stronger benefit the weaker firm, Firm 
2, as it may lure more customers from the dominant firm. However this is not 
the case, as mentioned earlier before, an increase in the propensity to switch 
results in more competition and lower prices for both firms. Thus there is no 
benefit for either firm from an increase in this metric and the beneficiaries on 
the other hand are the consumers. A further role of this metric, as described 
by Gideon, concerns monopoly markets. In these, competition may only come 
from   new   entrants   and   here   the   propensity   of   consumers   switching   is 
primordial. When it attains a sufficiently high level competition may find a 
prosperous   ground   to   grow   on.   In   markets   with   existing   competition   an 
increase in the propensity to switch can improve the outcome for a duopoly, 
unless the underlying market characteristics cause it to dip into a monopoly. 
The first best solution would require the propensity to switch to fluctuate and 
act as a catalyst, in order to balance the market for competition and against a 
monopoly. 
2.4  Conclusion of the dynamic Network Pricing 
Game
The   dynamic   version   of   the   NPG   reveals   that,   based   on   the   underlying 
characteristics, there are again three different possible market outcomes: 
Inevitable Monopoly, Sustainable Duopoly and undetermined Markets. For the 
latter, the final market structure is heavily determined by the firms initial 
market share allocation. An increase in the disparity of initial market share 
distribution  will   proportionately  increase  the  likelihood   of   a  monopoly   as 
outcome. In the illustration on the next page, the green shaded areas indicate 
a duopoly as the market outcome, whereas the red ones signal a market of 
monopoly. In the centre element the colour gradient is weak in order to 
underline the uncertainty of the final state of the market.
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On the vertical axis we find the initial market share allocations. By assumption 
(c), that was made at the beginning of the static NPG, Firm 1 is slightly larger 
than Firm 2. Therefore the range of  o  is from 0.5 to 1, with Firm 2 receiving 
the remaining share of  α−0=1–α0 .
On the horizontal axis we find the critical market share   
*   in it's role of 
signaling how favorable market conditions (fixed cost, variable cost, prices and 
consumers propensity to switch) are to allow for competition in the market as 
well as market entry by new players. 
The next part will address some thoughts and ideas about how this model can 
be of use for policy makers for Sub Saharan African countries, to maintain a 
healthy competition in their young mobile telecommunications sector.
44
Illustration 11:  o / 
* Market Structure Matrix
*= 0 *= 0.5
*
o= 0.5
o= 1
Critical Market Share for Survival
Firms initial 
Market Share 
Allocation o3   Dynamic Network Pricing Game: A comparison to reality in Africa II
3  Dynamic Network Pricing Game: A comparison to reality in 
Africa II
Returning from the extensive discussion of the Network Pricing Game and its 
direct implications on the health of competition in a network market, this final 
part shall first draw a parallel between the NPG and some selected African 
Telecommunications   Markets   structures   and   then   provide   an   outlook   on 
further ground breaking changes on the continent, yet to come. Changes that 
will build upon the virtues of mobile telecommunications.
In   the   introduction   of   this   theses   the   massive   growth   of   the   mobile 
telecommunication sector has been outlined with numerous examples. Yet we 
all should expect that this rapid growth will sooner or later abate, when levels 
of connectivity approach a density of 100% and the market is saturated. Then 
further growth will no longer be coming from new customer subscriptions, but 
from acquiring either the customers of rival operators, or even by acquiring 
the rival operators themselves. Hence by a process of consolidation in the 
local market. The current small numbers of competing firms and the eminent 
presence  of a dominant operator in every African country will then give 
reasons for concern about a market concentration reaching into monopoly with 
all its negative implications for customers. 
We shall now have a look at some market structures in a few representative 
countries. Nigeria has been selected for its position as Sub Saharan Africa's 
second biggest economy, behind South Africa and for its ranking as Africa's 
most populous country. Uganda and Mali have been chosen as they are both 
landlocked countries. Mauritius and Madagascar as island states, whereby 
Mauritius is further outstanding as its the winning African country of the Mo 
Ibrahim   Index,   an   award   for   outstanding   political   governance,   mentioned 
earlier. Senegal for its recent achievements of political reforms in view of 
facilitating business. „Since 2004 various countries have brought in more than 
1,000 reforms. Three of the top reformers in 2007-08 were African – Senegal, 
Burkina Faso and Botswana.
60“ Kenya is mentioned due to its declining market 
60The Economist March 12
th 2009, Global Heros. A special report on entrepreneurship. 
Article: An idea whose time has come.
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dominated by one operator still owning a significant market share. Though in 
mid
61 and late
62 2008 two new competitors have opened operations in Kenya, 
raising the level of competition significantly as they price into the market with 
very low rates. South Africa is obligatory on the list, as it was the first country 
in Africa with a mobile telecommunication network deployment in 1998 and 
thus has the continents longest history within this industry.
The third row of the table displays the number of local operating firms in 
mobile telecommunication services – providing phone calls, text messages, 
data services and increasingly mobile internet access. Values in the second 
row reflect the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) values for the mentioned 
countries. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: H =∑
i=1
N
S i
2
The HHI is an indicator for the degree of competition within an industry 
expressed by its concentration. It is calculated by the total sum of the squared 
individual   firms   sizes.   The   index   is   used   for   example   by   the   American 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, to reduce large 
61Waruru, Maina. AfricaNews.  Kenya telecom gets ready for third provider.  Nairobi, 
Kenya. 1
st July 2008. The complete article can be found in the Annex. 
62Kemibaro, Moses. YU Mobile  Network  Launches  in Kenya.  December 1
st  2008, 
Nairobi, Kenya.
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Table 4: Market Concentration in Selected African 
Countries. Source: Local Telecom Comissions, ITU, 
Africa & Middle Easet Telecom Week et al. 
Market Concentration Statistics for 2008-2009
Country HHI-Index No. of Operators
Nigeria 0.3 8
Uganda 0.31 5
Madagascar 0.36 3
South Africa 0.46 3
Mauritius 0.52 2
Senegal 0.54 3
Kenya 0.65 4
Mali 0.7 2
Namibia 0.77 23   Dynamic Network Pricing Game: A comparison to reality in Africa II
statistics into one meaningful number, with a HHI value above 0.18 indicating 
a high market concentration. 
It   is   not   surprising   in   this   case,   to   see   that   across   the   board,   African 
telecommunication markets are highly concentrated. This concentration is 
only partially attributed to the little number of competitors, as a market with 
three competitors, each owning a third of the market would translate into a 
HHI of 0.33, a result Nigeria just underbids with a total of eight operators. This 
reveals high values of HHI to be a result of market dominance by a single 
operator, as extreme asymmetries in size of market share reflect stronger into 
the result through the sums of squared shares.
These   observations   show,   that   the   dynamic   Network   Pricing   Game's 
assumptions are very close to reality and network industries tend to have a 
dominant player. From the above listed countries, only Madagascar, Nigeria 
and Uganda do not have a single firm with more than 50% market share, 
although the 47%, 41% and 47% market share respectively are not too fare 
away of the 50% mark. It can further be noted that African markets are clearly 
indeterminate markets, as to speak in terms of the NPG. They all exhibit high 
growth rates and thus are suspects for an apparent competition which may, 
when consolidation starts to gain ground, very likely end in a monopoly. 
Governments   should   thus   take   needed   action,   to   change   the   markets 
underlying characteristics
63 to foster a competitive market on the long run. 
Despite the strong to medium market imparity of operators across Africa there 
is one undeniable fact:  Access to and use of mobile telecommunication has 
rocket-propelled Africa into the ICT-age and brought along the most significant 
impact on social and economic life. Putting a single value to the creation of 
welfare is a daunting task. There are endless positive effects that have to be 
taken   into   account.   What   is   much   better   observable,   are   the   indirect 
consequences of this impact on welfare. 
63Characteristics including such features as the portability of mobile phone numbers 
across access providers, lowering of interconnection fees between network operators 
for terminating calls and text messages on rival networks, network sharing to cut 
fixed costs for new entrants and to counter over capacities being built up over time.  
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First, African markets have weathered the current economic crisis far 
better   than   anyone   would   have   expected.   Africa   has   not   proved   to   be 
completely resistant to the global economic downturn, but its natural way in 
dealing with crises in day to day life has provided it with a comparative 
advantage in coping with economic and political shocks.
Second, Africa has seen its highest average growth rates in the past 
decade. Critics may argue that a great portion is attributed to exports of 
minerals.   But   despite   many   countries'   strong   dependency   on   exports   of 
minerals, a great contribution to national growth rates is directly tied to the 
miracles of mobile telecommunication
64. Mobile phones have enabled millions 
to exit unemployment and start a business venture with little investment 
needs. The strong growth of the industry has itself created a great number of 
jobs, sucking in well educated university graduates by large numbers. 
Third  there   is   the   impact   on   governments   earnings.   The   sale   of 
broadcasting frequencies may just be a windfall profit, but long term tax 
income   from   service   providers   should   be   a   welcome   diversification   for 
governments, even if they have to assure for competition within their local 
market
65.
Forth, In my humble opinion the mobile telecommunication boom has 
ignited a “self propelled” process of welfare generation. To illustrate this 
statement I have pictured the key elements in a star formation.
64The Economist. A special report on entrepreneurship. An Idea who's time has come. 
March 12th 2009
65Competition leads to lower prices and smaller profit margins among the involved 
players. This translates into smaller tax earnings by governments. This gives reason 
for concern when government interests merge with those of the operator(s).
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Reading the illustration clockwise, the welfare cycle was ignited by a process 
of   deregulation   in   telecommunications   markets   across   Africa.   With   early 
movers such as South Africa and laggards such as Ethiopia, whose only mobile 
operator up to date, the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC), is 
state owned and operated. Its characterized by poor signal coverage, low level 
of services and clogged networks throughout the day. This appalling state 
translates into a penetration level of just 3.2% of its current population of 80 
Million. A deregulation of the Ethiopian Market would bring new investment 
and much needed competition into the country. With competition as the 
enabling factor for an increase in network coverage, availability of services 
and choice, it signifies the foundations of long term welfare creation. The 
transition form a monopoly to market of competition comes with a new price 
war between the operators, seeking to grow their customer base in the long 
run
66. With declining prices for mobile services and sinking costs for handsets, 
entry barriers for consumers, even in the poorest countries, are lowered 
allowing a significant growth in subscribers. The joint consideration of the 
previous stages culminates in an overall increase in welfare which induces 
many other positive effects, called positive network externalities. Some of 
which will be mentioned hereafter. The expression “Pareto” in brackets shall 
signify the importance of the increase in welfare Africa is experiencing. Those 
profiting   from   an   increase   in   utility,   achieve   this   amelioration,   without 
66This may very well include a strategy of rent seeking. 
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Illustration 12: Self Propelled Welfare Generation through Mobile Telecommunication 
Deregulation
Competition
Decline of prices
Subscriber growth
Increase in overall 
Welfare (Pareto)
Positive Network 
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deteriorating the welfare of others involved. A process that can be kept alive, 
but will need intervention, before market concentration leads to a monopoly.
3.1  Positive   Network   Externalities   of   Mobile 
Telecommunication
Beyond the positive effects discussed in the first chapter, notably mobile 
banking and the access to information and education, there is another hugely 
positive network effect making headway from 2010 onwards: mobile internet. 
The internet revolution in Africa has not yet picked up steam, currently seen in 
mobile telecommunications. But predictions are good, that the mobile phone 
will be the device of choice for millions of Africans to access the internet in the 
coming years. An achievement building on the current boom and thus turning 
internet services delivered to handsets into another major externality to be 
attributed to mobile telecommunication. 
There are three predominant facts supporting this hypothesis. 
One, from the early to late 90's nobody in the telecommunication industry 
of developed economies was expecting the mobile phone to be a service 
affordable or needed by the African People. Time, as this theses shows, has 
proven them wrong and their views overly pessimistic. The internet is thus to 
be considered to accomplish a similar achievement in only a few years.
Two, with continued competition between operators, the price spiral will 
continue to fall and hence drive up subscriber levels till the market reaches 
saturation. In an attempt by operators, to create new revenue streams, they 
will start to offer further services to their existing customer base. These 
services may either be rolled out in the form of additional services offered, 
while maintaining prices fixed, to keep customers loyal, or by charging extra 
fees for their use. 
Three, there are huge investments going on to link Africa's eastern and 
western shores to the optic fiber cable spanning the world. This fiber cable is 
serving as its center backbone of data exchange and Africa till 2009 was 
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deprived of access to this optic fiber cable. A very old cable running from 
southeast Asia to Mauritius and South Africa, before climbing up north on 
Africa's west coast, to reach Spain, has not been a real deal with its very low 
data throughput of just 360 gigabits per second. Thus data connections for 
international phone calls and internet access had to rely on expensive satellite 
links, to be connected to the world. Gladly this is a picture of the past. The 
future is depicted by the below illustration of fiber optic submarine cables. A 
line's thickness is an indication for its data throughput capacity.
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With Table 4, further detailed statistics about these cables are provided. It is 
amazing to see how close the expected times of completion are. Considering 
the substantial amount of time and financial investment needed to build a new 
optic fiber connection, the original decisions by the investors have been taken 
during the last economic boom between 2004 and 2007. During this time low 
interest rates have dominated financial markets and motivated the global 
financial industry to seek ever new investment opportunities. With lesser 
options of making high returns in developed economies and an increasing 
demand for growing returns by investors, some funds origination in wealthy 
nations have found their way into submarine cables projects. Reasons why we 
can find sovereign funds from the Agha Kahn and a few American Special 
Purpose Vehicles among the majority of African investors for these projects.
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Table 5: Sub-Saharan Undersea Cables Statistics4  Conclusion
Africa in general, and Sub Saharan Africa in particular is experiencing a current 
boom   in   mobile   telecommunication.   This   unprecedented   and   largely 
unexpected event has unlocked real growth potential on the microeconomic as 
well as the macroeconomic scale. With economic opportunities emerging from 
within Africa, the motivation and identification with the associated positive 
network effects on the greater economy possess a clear advantage on the 
motivation. A motivation that has since the turn of the millennium changed 
millions of lives for the better. With mobile telecommunications being such a 
young industry in Africa, the sector still has some leeway before it enters a 
large scale consolidation. A process which has an inherent risk of monopoly as 
a market outcome. Therefore governments with an active politic of monitoring 
competition and providing market conditions favoring a competitive  local 
telecommunication market will have a leading edge in assuring prosperity for 
the future of their nations. An African future.
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A.1  Kenya   telecom   gets   ready   for   third 
provider
By Maina Waruru, AfricaNews reporter in Nairobi, Kenya. Tuseday, 1
st July 2008
Kenya is set to have a third mobile phone operator this August, bring 
an end to a duopoly enjoyed by Safaricom Limited and Celtel Kenya 
for years.
Kenya is set to have a third mobile phone operator this August , bring an end 
to a duopoly enjoyed by Safaricom Limited and Celtel Kenya for years.
The dominance of the two will come when the latest entrant into the market 
Econet Wireless International (ECI) enters the rolls out its network in the 
country bringing to three the number of operators and ushering in much 
needed competition .
The entry of ECI into market will also bring in new products experts say, away 
from  the   normal   voice   and   data  services   offered   by  the   pair  who  have 
dominated local seen over the past 8 years.
Indications that the firm was ready to take the plunge became clear on 
Monday this week when it announced senior staff appointments for Kenya 
operations , with Michael Foley formerly of Celtel Tanzania being named CEO .
Others named include Anna Othoro formerly working for Celtel Kenya and who 
was appointed marketing director , a pointer to the fact ECI poached heavily 
from the pan African mobile phone operator.
ECI making its first step into the region made the move months ahead of 
Telkom Kenya which later in the year is set to enter the GSM market , making 
the field even more crowded but more competitive.
The entry of ECI marks an end to 5 years of conflict between the Southern 
African firm and Kenya government over a host of issues ranging from its 
ownership structure to its financial and technical capacity to offer GSM service.
The company has been in Kenya since 2003 when it won a bid to commence 
services in the country but its Kenyan partners the Kenya National Federation 
of Cooperatives (KNFC) failed to raise part of its financial commitment forcing 
ECI to take up 41% reserved for the Kenyan firm.
IThis resulted in a 2 year long legal battle that ended in 2005, but the firm 
again was unable to raise the money on its own forcing then information 
minister Raphael Tuju to cancel. The move was contested by the company 
which the courts ruled in its favor in 2006.
The company payed $100 million license to the government this year allowing 
it to commence business in the country .
That was not before roping in Indian telecoms firm Essar communications 
holdings which bought a 49% stake in ECI and injecting in much needed 
capital , to enable the firm pay for the license.
The company started recruiting senior staff in April this sending jitters across 
the 2 Kenyan operators who feared losing top and qualified staff to the new 
entrant.
As it turned only Celtel the lesser of the pair turned victim with Safaricom the 
most profitable firm in East and Central Africa retaining its senior personnel.
ECI will to fight hard to a get its own market segment in a market of an 
estimated 13 million subscribers with Safaricom having 10.5 million of those, 
an equivalent of 85% leaving Celtel with a meager 15%.
The anticipated entry of ECI is eagerly awaited by subscribers who are hoping 
for new products and lower calling tariffs.
Entrenched   operators   Safaricom   and   Celtel   have   been   offering   reviewing 
tariffs and carrying out promotions to keep subscribers hooked, a number of 
whom only used to the pair may be tempted to jump ship.
IIIA.2  Cheap Talk? 
How far does a day's minimum wage brings you in phone minutes and 
text messages to rival operators?
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Illustration 14: Number of call minutes a days work will earn you at minimum wage. 
Source: Song, Steve, http://manypossibilities.net
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Algeria
Algerian Dinar 545.45  9.5  5  57.42  109
Angola
390.91  25.92  9  15.08  43
Benin
CFA 1363.64  100  50  13.64  27
CFA 1394.73  230  30  6.06  46
Burundi
francs 157.58  300  20  0.53  8
Cam eroon
CFA 1283.91  200  50  6.42  26
M TN 
Chad
CFA 1272.73  260  25  4.9  51
Congo
CFA 2454.55  145  50  16.93  49
CFA 1663.95  99  50  16.81  33
Orange 
Gabon
CFA 3636.36  250  50  14.55  73
Ghana
2.76  0.14  0.05  19.72  55
M TN 
Kenya
148.64  15  5  9.91  30
Lesotho
36.91  2.9  0.75  12.73  49
Libya
dinar 5.91  0.24  0.05  24.62  118
M adagascar
3182.95  390  120  8.16  27
Orange 
M alaw i
167.82  47.71  13.16  3.52  13
M auritania
961.36  65  8  14.79  120
M auritius
rand 144.58  3.9  0.6  37.07  241
Orange 
M orocco
87.88  4.8  0.8  18.31  110
Niger
CFA 1272.73  195  75  6.53  17
Nigeria
250  37  15  6.76  17
M TN 
South Africa
rand 78.96  2.99  0.8  26.41  99
Djezzy (O rascom ) 
kwanzas
Unitel 
M TN(M ascom ) 
Burkina Faso
Zain 
U-Com m  (O rascom ) 
Zain 
Zain 
Côte d’Ivoire
Zain 
ghana cedi
kenyan shilling
Safaricom  
m aloti
Vodacom  
Libyana 
ariary
kwacha
Zain 
ouguiya
M auritel 
dirham s
M aroc Telecom  
Zain 
nairaA.3  Visualized GSM and 3G coverage in Africa
VII
Illustration 15: GSM and 3G coverage in Africa. Latest available visualized data from 
end of 2007. Source: GSM Association. 2008A.4  African Undersea Cables Investor details
Seacom (http://www.seacom.mu)
Industrial   Promotion   Services   (25%),   an   arm   of   the   Aga   Khan   Fund   for 
Economic Development (USD 75 million)
(Kenya – founded by Prince Karim Aga Khan IV of Pakistan)
VenFin Limited (25%) – USD 75 million)
Herakles Telecom LLC (backed by Blackstone) (25%), New York-based lead 
company, no website (USD 75 million)
Convergence Partners (12,5%) – USD 37.5 million
Shanduka Group (12.5%) – USD 37.5 million
EASSy (http://www.eassy.org/)
EASSy is 90% African owned although that ownership is underwritten by a 
substantial investment by Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) including 
World Bank/IFC, EIB, AfDB, AFD, and DfW. Total DFI investment is apparently 
$70.7 million, with $18.2 million coming from IFC, 14.5 million from AfDB. This 
is a smaller amount than the originally advertised $120 million investment 
from DFIs.
South African investors in EASSY include Telkom South Africa ($18.9 million) , 
Neotel, and MTN.
There are 26 telco operators in total invested in EASSy.
An SPV created to facilitate. open access will be the biggest shareholder, with 
46%.
In Jan 2008, VSNL announced an investment in EASSy
TEAMs
85 per cent of the cable is owned by TEAMs (Kenya) Ltd and the rest by 
Etisalaat of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).   The TEAMS (Kenya) Ltd holding 
breaks down as follows:
20% – Government of Kenya (through Min. of Finance) 
IX20% – Safaricom Ltd 
20% – Telkom Kenya Ltd 
10% – Kenya Data Networks Ltd 
10% – Econet/Essar Telecom Ltd 
5% – Wananchi Group 
3.75% – Jamii Telecom Ltd 
1.25% – Broadband Access/AccessKenya Ltd 
1.25% – Africa Fibrenet (Uganda) Ltd 
1.25% – InHand Ltd 
1.25% – iQuip Ltd 
1.25% – Flashcom Ltd 
West African Cable System (WACS)
Telkom 
Vodacom 
MTN 
Tata Communications (Neotel) 
Infraco 
Cable & Wireless 
Portugal Telecoms 
Telecom Namibia 
Togo Telecom 
Angola Telecom 
Sotelco (U.S.) 
MaIN OnE
Privately owned. On June 1, 2009, the African Development Bank confirmed  
USD 66 million financing for the project.
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XIXAbbreviations & Expressions
SSA. Sub-Saharan Africa. All countries of  Africa except the northern African 
countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Western Sahara. 
FDI. Foreign Direct Investment. Foreign direct investment is defined as an 
investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest 
in and control by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or 
parent  enterprise)   of   an   enterprise   resident   in   a  different  economy   (FDI 
enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate). Such investment involves 
both   the   initial   transaction  between   the   two entities   and  all   subsequent 
transactions between them and among foreign affiliates. Source of definition: 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009.
Innate. Innate is a synonym for inherent, or a natural tendency. 
Propensity  Propensity is derived from the Latin word propendere, "to 
incline to, to hang forward, to weigh over"; from pro-, "forward" + pendere, "to 
hang".
ICT.  Information   and   communication   technologies.   allow   users   to 
participate in a rapidly changing world in which work and other activities are 
increasingly transformed by access to varied and developing technologies. By 
this definition, you could almost say ICT is technology's version of economic 
growth, to satisfy the needs and wants of the community over time. ICT tools 
can be used to find, explore, analyze, exchange and present information 
responsibly and without discrimination. ICT can be employed to give users 
quick   access   to   ideas   and   experiences   from   a   wide   range   of   people, 
communities and cultures.
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67Definition taken from wikipedia.org
XXIGSM.  Global System for Mobile Communications. It is the most popular 
standard for mobile telephone systems in the world. The GSM Association, its 
promoting   industry   trade   organization   of   mobile   phone   carriers   and 
manufactures, estimates that 80% of the global mobile  market uses the 
standard.
68
3G.  The  3rd   Generation   of   standards   for   mobile   telecommunications 
defined by the International Telecommunication Union. Services include wide-
area wireless voice telephone, video calls, and wireless data, all in a mobile 
environment. Compared to GSM (2G) services, 3G allows simultaneous use of 
speech and data services and higher data transmission and reception rates. 
Thus, 3G networks enable network operators to offer users a wider range of 
more advanced services while achieving greater network capacity through 
improved spectral efficiency.
NPG. Network Pricing Game
.com bubble. The .com bubble was a speculative bubble in stock markets 
in Europe and the United States, which ended in the first quarter of 2000. The 
bubble   was   fueled   by   technology   firms   covering   sectors   from   telecom-
munications   to   internet   based   services   and   businesses.   The   latter   were 
characterized by big visions, high market valuations and steep losses, as 
turning simple ideas into earnings proved more troublesome than many had 
expected.
68Definition taken from wikipedia.org
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